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Fringe Experientiality 
James Missen 
Being contemporary means to be with "the times" or, rather, in the 
"now." However, as I recently sat down to  write a paper for the Tulips 
panel aimed at discussing generational shifts in the production of fringe 
media works and the social and critical discourses which surround(ed) 
these changes, I struggled to grasp the notion of "the times." What are 
they exactly? And, more specifically, what are the principles and practices 
that influence and mediate the experience of their passage? It is my inten- 
tion here to argue in favour of sense, or specificity, as a means by which 
to understand my particular experiences of recent events on the fringe 
rather than resorting to abstractions. This will allow me to situate my 
thoughts within the broader context of these debates. I begin with a brief 
examination of the politics of "the times," specifically with respect to 
what the contemporary media artist is and could be attuned to both in 
practice and in theory. Conversely, I am also strikingly aware of what 
divergent times "the times" comprise, which leaves me to consider 
whether there are indeed materials, ideas, events which are left out of the 
conventional discourse of "the times7'-lingering as possibilities, lying 
just beneath their constructed surface. How then might the fringe media 
artist address and inform these alternate conceptions of "the times"? 
On July 7th, 2001, at  an Ottawa Art Gallery symposium entitled 
Re(p)lay and Retroaction: The 1960s, Revolution, andlin Contemporary 
Culture, filmmaker and scholar Gary Kibbins commented, "We need to 
extend the period of experimentalism to see where it goes." This declara- 
tion implicitly calls for an expansion of the tensions that exist between 
art, politics, and the realm of the social in favour of an experimental 
practice that is process-oriented and "useless" by design. His statement 
emerged from a debate following his talk entitled "Work and Anarchy," 
which detailed how the historical avant-garde (e.g. the Dadaists and the 
Situationists) made art so as to respond vigorously to the cultural ambiva- 
lence toward work, particularly physical labour associated with the neces- 
sities of life. His statement is well taken, in that our current times appear 
to be such that we are in need of an avant-garde (or what I have chosen to 
call a "fringe") of renewed cultural significance, which produces aesthetic 
works that somehow avoid overt commodification and capitalist incorpo- 
ration. The very fact that there is such a need implies that whatever 
period of artistic experimentalism we are currently in is predisposed to 
playing through the current cultural situation to get through to ... well, 
whatever is next. Therefore, let me pause to scrutinize the discursive and 
practical terms by which we continue to define experimentalism and the 
limits at work therein. 
In the program notes for a series of six experimental video screenings 
held in the Fall of 2001 at the Canadian Museum of Contemporary Pho- 
tography in Ottawa, Ontario,l curator Jenny Lion writes, 
Many of the tapes in Magnetic North take risks-risks of offending, of 
self-revelation or self-assertion, of political commitment, of resisting cen- 
sorship ... or of choosing to entertain in the face of catastrophe. At stake is 
the act of invention: the process of trying something out, and a willingness 
to gamble. I use "experimental" as an inclusive term associated with 
inventive, often subversive approaches to  process, context, or content. 
I find Lion's comments pleasantly bold, yet also perplexing, as it is 
unclear to me whether her words help to shed light on or obscure the 
understanding of either the historical avant-garde scene in Canada and its 
contemporary descendants, or the socio-cultural significance of producing 
and experiencing fringe work. In fact, Lion's choice of language is particu- 
larly revealing in terms of how she defines "experimentalism" in a gener- 
ally closed sense. Recall her assertion that many of the Magnetic North 
tapes "take risks," and, while doing so, acknowledge the fact that she is 
saying so in the present tense. Is it necessarily so that all avant-garde works 
are forever situated in "the times," taking risks in their efforts to subvert or 
criticize more conventional forms of representation? I would argue against 
this, and, interestingly, this exhibition seems to back up my claim. Certain 
earlier videos featured in the program, such as A1 Razutis' 98.3 KHz: 
(Bridge a t  electrzcal storm) (1973) or Pierre Falardeau's Continuons Le 
Combat (1971), might be more accurately described as having taken risks, 
with respect not only to the socio-historical context in which they were 
originally produced, but also in terms of how they are received in the now. 
The distinction is quite important in this context. To imply that all experi- 
mental works at all times are always in the process of taking risks is prob- 
lematic, for the avant-garde's themes and strategies are indeed transformed 
by the differing needs of a changed historical era. Furthermore, to say so 
limits the terms by which we try to define experimentalism as something 
other than a genre or a collection of effects. It does not allow the works to 
fail, to be other than "risky," or to "breathe" if you will, for a good crite- 
rion of important (perhaps canonical) work is that it should always be 
experienced anew. In sum, I generally find Lion's description of experimen- 
tal works discursively limiting and enframing, which is definitely not her 
intention in spite of the critical effects her language seems to produce. 
That being said, one must acknowledge that a significant portion of 
fringe media (more so within video than film) made in the previous gener- 
ations of the "twm+pde" (to borrow Mike Hoolboom's term) was for- 
mally and aesthetically dependent on the centre, or was being produced 
with the implicitlexplicit agenda of problematizing the codes of main- 
stream ideological mastery. Thus, as a viewer, one can pick and choose 
amongst examples from whatever era (the tapes of Colin Campbell, Vera 
Frenkel, or Lisa Steele from the late 70s and early 80s immediately come 
to mind) but one theme remains: the makers of these works often enacted 
irony so as to borrow from or hijack the codes, conventions, politics, aes- 
thetics of more dominant sites of address and ways of seeing (read, the 
mainstream). As I wish to point out, this just is not enough any more. 
John Champagne's complex description of marginality in his 1995 book 
The Ethics of Marginality-as that which is always constructed both 
inside and outside of the normalizing centre(s)-helps one to understand 
that fringe work has always been made simultaneously alongsidelagainst 
its conventional counterparts in the mainstream. However, I would argue 
that the shifting socio-economic realities of "the times" necessitate that 
experimental media artists respond accordingly, and they are doing so 
currently by contributing to the crafting of "useless," affective space(s) 
within the broader culture. 
Recall my criticisms of Jenny Lion's description of "Canadian" experi- 
mentalism as "always taking risks" from earlier in this essay. Her pro- 
gram notes imply that all experimental works at all times are always in 
the process of taking risks, which is a tenuous assertion given that the 
fringe's themes and strategies shift according to the differing needs of that 
historical era. Rather, experimental works are always seen as "meaning- 
ful" when experienced phenomenologically, even though the meaning(s) 
of these works and responses to them shift in accordance with the politics 
of "the times." Thus, experiencing earlier tapes such as Frenkel's demon- 
strates that her art's relationship to Michel Foucault's unthought (that 
which is inexpressible and beyond language) or Gilles Deleuze's non-sense 
(that which is beyond sense and logic) was different than it is now. In 
looking at her videos phenomenologically through a subjective analysis of 
their affective qualities, one can see the ways in which works from previ- 
ous eras related to the unthought and can help us do the same in a con- 
temporary context. 
Phenomenology and the Fringe Experience 
As Foucault points out in The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Senses2, temporary sets of classifications can prove useful and do not have 
to be universal in their scope, unlike Aristotelian classifications of the 
world. Thus, the personal and subjective experience of fringe media does 
not necessarily reflect the aesthetic and political concerns of the time in 
which certain films and videos were originally made, because some works 
may no longer be experienced in the way they were in other contexts. In 
any given period, experimental works correspond loosely to contempo- 
rary theoretical paradigms, be they transcendental phenomenology, struc- 
turalism, psychoanalytic feminism, semiotics, activism, queer theory, or 
identity politics to name but a few of the "trends" of the last thirty-plus 
years. In turn, even though these paradigms formed the original contexts 
in which fringe works were both produced and (affectively) received, 
these models are not necessarily always useful now, nor in keeping with 
my (or anyone else's) experiences of fringe work in the present. As I will 
explain, the phenomenological model of double articulation offers the 
best explanation for these shifts in viewership contexts, because each time 
a work is perceived, its expressions (though historically specific) are 
received anew.3 This observation came to me as I surveyed my sensory 
interactions not only with older works, but also the more "current" 
works from the early to mid-1990s on. Generally speaking, their form and 
content did not seem so easily slotted in accordance with a prominent aes- 
thetic associated with progressive discourses of "risk" andlor re~istance.~ 
Since the histories of our era are still being written, I find loose, tenta- 
tive assessments of phenomenological reception of audio-visual stimuli 
more in keeping with the contemporary situation. In fact, I want to sug- 
gest that affect and the categories it inspires shift in the chronological ebb 
and flow of Canadian experimental media production, and that the way to 
assess and define affect alters across time and space. For example, in the 
late 1970s, a formalist critic looking at Patricia Gruben's film The Central 
Character (1977) might have seen the film's black and white extreme 
close-ups of pallid hands holding a sweeping broom, or its use of negative 
printing for the image of a solitary woman, as a literalization of how the 
natural world can consume and blur the order apparent in the everyday. It 
would no doubt have been categorized as a "feminist" or a "formalist" 
film. Yet when I, a particular, intertwined body and mind who is embed- 
ded in the locatedness of the social, the political-the "times," if you will 
-see T h e  Central Character for the first time (as I did in June, 2000), 
what am I to experience and then classify as sensorially "important"? The 
same negative printing and detailed imagery still remain as essences of the 
film, and yet the way in which they function so as to signify other phe- 
nomena-social, cultural, conceptual, what have you-have changed in 
terms of how I affectively make sense of those phenomena in the "now." 
Thus, my phenomenological categorization of fringe media both coin- 
cides with and diverges from strictly cognitive approaches, and, indeed, 
from other paradigms that dominated particular periods of fringe media 
production and reception. On the one hand, in certain works, affect is 
deployed so as to enable its audience to make sense of what the work is 
trying to do. Yet, on the other, I refuse to say that this is the only thing at 
work in the doubly-articulated relationship between the way the film per- 
ceives what it perceives (its look and sound, its feel, and the way the audi- 
ence receives what it expresses). Affect occurs both in the expression of 
the work itself and in my reception of the work's expression. Moreover, 
the affective value of experimental media in general lies in these subjective 
qualities, as if it is relaying to the audience the message, "I do not want 
you to ever fully know me." Perhaps this, in turn, is where the pleasure of 
experiencing marginal media is derived, in that a work can never be truly 
known, but only experienced multi-sensorially through affective engage- 
ment with its form, aesthetics, and content. Nevertheless, my own 
embodied social and political locatedness as a subject initiates a particu- 
lar affective reception of experimental film and video that, in turn, pro- 
vides a valuable interpretive tool as to how to understand these works as 
(cultural) theory. 
This kind of film and video analysis via phenomenological double 
articulation involves three interrelated aspects. The first is that of percep- 
tion by the work itself, and bears a resemblance to  content, or how a 
work is "about something." The second element involves the way the 
work expresses itself, to the extent that this can incorporate form and 
aesthetics, or the look and sound of the "thingness" of the work in its 
particularities. Last, and most importantly, is the reception by the viewer 
(me) and how slhe (I) receive that expression. Again, reception can imply 
a cognitive approach, whereby the viewer makes an effort to assemble 
some kind of understanding or "knowledge" from herkis experience of 
the work. However, while my subjective analyses do at times touch on 
these kinds of experiences, my overall intent is to stress how affect in 
experimental media is perceivedlreceived in the body of the socially and 
politically located spectator and how it is "valuable" as cultural theory.5 
Conversely, and with respect to Lion's thesis, one idea does stand out 
from her comments in terms of loosely defining experimentalism, and 
that is her notion that something is "at stake [in] the act of invention." 
Implicitly, the act of trying something carries with it an inherent cultural 
value regardless of how it turns out. This reduces the complexities of my 
earlier point about Razutis and Falardeau to a critical position whereby 
one can simultaneously acknowledge that these artists did "experiment" 
with the medium of video, yet whether or not that past experiment is still 
of cultural value or importance is moot. For it is the very act of experi- 
mentation that mattered and continues to matter, and not the end result. 
This description of experimentalism allows us to move towards consider- 
ing the making of contemporary time-based art as "laboratory work." 
Another way to state this could be, "The aesthetic of 'making do' with a 
time and a space that are no longer considered abstract, utopian, or alter- 
native will allow us once again to create, represent, and project ourselves 
as subjects into a History that seems to do very well without us."6 Thus, 
defining the practice of experimentation as "making do" embraces 
Deleuze's logic of sense inasmuch as it emphasizes the value of "useless- 
ness" inherent in the present tense. 
Similarly, fringe works do not (and should not) necessarily have to lead 
somewhere or be quantifiable in their end result, as it may not even be 
possible to  assess this. For example, there is a 1996 video by Susan C. 
Rynard entitled Eight Men Called Eugene that I would argue functions as 
an allegory for how (as a culture) we need to experience, participate with, 
and produce the fringe in a non-sensical and loose manner. The tape is 
stylistically structured in the form of a faux documentary in which a 
female genetics scientist tours the viewer around a high-tech laboratory so 
as to explain how the evolution of the human genome project is equal 
parts progressive technological development and not-so-humorous teleo- 
logical coincidence. For you see, Rynard's Eight Men attempts to adapt 
the slick production look and generic conventions of the corporate 
infomercial so as to interrogate the limits of how audiences often subordi- 
nate audio-visual experience to instrumental ends. In responding to  the 
video's expressions (the "thingness" of its sounds and image) affectively, 
which is a relationship mediated in part by how we subjectively view the 
shortcomings of the work's "professional-looking" aesthetics, one opens 
up a way of seeing how Rynard's experiment relates to the unthought. 
Her replicationlco-option of mainstream conventions in order to invert 
their ideological implications is an example of Massera's "making do," in 
that the work opens up the space of how social knowledges are fallibly 
constructed. In this instance, Rynard's video relates to the notion that the 
social and political construction of "knowledges" sometimes manifests 
results of grave significance; read: contemporary genetic engineering as an 
extension of Eugenics. 
Too Much Art/Not Enough Utopia? 
Unlike the historical avant-garde that Kibbins described in his talk "Work 
and Anarchy," the contemporary fringe artist does not appear to  be 
(falsely) captivated by the possibility of realizing utopia. This stance is 
made quite literal within the discursive strategies of productions such as 
Kika Thorne's Work (1999) and Steve Reinke's Afternoon (March 22, 
1999) (1999), though it is not exclusive to these two videos alone. In the 
latter work, the artistlnarrator Reinke invites an affective response to the 
video by asking his audience to think of its ephemera as "a jazz improvi- 
sation after years of experience making other compositions." Included in 
the work's loose structure, which is mediated by Reinke's narrated explo- 
ration of in-camera editing and the technological limitations of his 
recently purchased digital video camera, is a section in which he wonders 
whether there is just too much art currently being made. The viewer affec- 
tively experiences Reinke's struggle to get the camera to focus on a colour 
slide that he juxtaposes with his apartment window, "Because a test of 
good art is if looking at a work is more interesting than looking outside." 
Once he achieves focus he comments, "I want to make good work but I 
don't think it is possible at this time ... All we can do is wait, cower and 
wait." He goes on to note, "This century has played itself out," which is a 
coy spatially-and temporally-specific reference to the mass media dri- 
ven anxiety surrounding the new millennium that was, at the time he 
made Afternoon, little more than nine months away. However, it is also a 
playful/sombre speculation on what the future (of art) might possibly 
bring, which implicitly asks: what kind of art is currently being produced 
out on the fringe(s)? 
One could make the "too much art" argument about how the contem- 
porary fringe merely produces a parade of references to its own disjointed 
and marginal history, and in doing so, becomes increasingly disconnected 
from the social.' In this regard, perhaps the "art school problem" of how 
critical and institutional strategies led to the problematic canonization 
and museumization of certain works has reached its unflinching end? 
However, Reinke's Afternoon and his comments therein allude not only 
to how there is much left to be done with respect to the fringe production 
of (socio-cultural) theory, but suggest also that contemporary art should 
be up to the task.8 His work is experienced not as a eulogy for the impos- 
sibility of (art) realizing utopia, inasmuch as it reinvigorates the need for 
fringe alternatives to the mainstream in terms of progressive viewership 
positions, or "visual grammars," and its politics of representation that do 
not problematically determine the Other. In their own ways, videos such 
as Afternoon, John Greyson's Packin' (2001), or Gary Kibbins' Car1 
Andre's Overalls (2000) demonstrate that artists' alternatives need to be 
produced and are continuing to be brought forth. Thus, to play out the 
scenario that ours is an era in which "everything is derivative" or "been 
done before" might be a fair, cursory assessment of fringe media, though 
this argument can be disproved if it is consistently followed through. As I 
have shown here, in conjunction with my earlier re-configuration of 
Lion's useful definition of experimentalism, all fringe experiments (from 
whatever era) are valuable and can be experienced anew. An affective 
response is progressive in that it both respects the original value(s) of the 
work and allows the viewer to change its meanings and be changed by 
them in the now. 
In this context, even contemporary works which are reactive in their 
polemical structure have some "value" to them, particularly in how they 
expose the limits of irony, which has long-dominated Canadian cultural 
production. In Jubal Brown's The Blob (1999), the tone of the narrator's 
sinister, nasal voice in conjunction with his choice of language, which 
equates participating in mainstream culture with being "sla~7es" or "zom- 
bies," together create a confusing barrier to making sense of the work's 
jarring aural and visual montage. The images, plundered from broadcast 
television and edited in the jagged, cyclical style of Istvan Kantor's Jericho 
(1991) or Accumulations (1999)-think of the image equivalent of a DJ 
scratching a record-intend to generate a sense of the (post?) apocalyptic 
panic that radiated throughout culture at  the time of its production, 
though with a more explicit political intent than in Afternoon. Brown's 
random loops and blips do sever the logic of suturing ideology to image 
that permeates the TV screens kept in suburban basements across North 
America. And yet, the narrator's words are (intentionally?) over-per- 
formed to the extent that they neither serve to rally the audience to attack 
the tyrannical hegemony of the mass media, nor do  they provide the 
viewer with the "out" of ironic dark comedy. The viewer's reception of its 
aggressive affect is unsettling inasmuch as the video, while demonstrating 
that tweaking the representational codes and conventions of mastery 
inherent in mass culture is formally and aesthetically possible, collapses 
the possibility for social and political subversion. The work's expressions 
insist that criticism of a centre also implies compliance. The potential 
problem then seems to be that ironic contemporary fringe works like The 
Blob (or, to a lesser extent, Eight Men Called Eugene) become black holes 
that spiral into negativity, whereas what the fringe needs is enough energy 
to spiral out into the new, the unknown. This seems to be the issue with 
some current fringe artists as negativity, or critique, is necessary but not 
sufficient for the "new" to come into being. Plus, any glance at  one's 
broadcast television screen shows how irony is instantly incorporated by 
capitalism. Which raises the question: where can that energy, to "spiral 
out," come from (now)? 
Fringe Art-Making, Digitalism, and the Problem of Capitalism 
Contemporary works demonstrate that while art  might not be able to 
"defeat" capitalism, artists do  need to be "smarter" than capitalism, 
which engulfs and incorporates everything to its purposes. In this regard, 
subversion and critique are inside-concepts, problematically lodged 
against the outside that is the mainstream. Similarly, I have noted how 
current fringe works are experienced as theoretical models for a kind of 
experimentalism that is more "autonomous" in its representational strate- 
gies and not so reliant on the mainstream as its nemesis, its mirror. Schol- 
ars like Kibbins and Sean Cubitt argue that contemporary media artists 
need to  further develop this autonomy. Cubitt even offers his own 
Deleuzean model for a new "digital aesthetics" that evaluates work not in 
terms of internal consistency or of wholeness (for wholes get eaten), but 
in terms of its openness, for the open is not easily inc~rpora ted .~  Cubitt 
demonstrates how in the digital age it is less effective than ever to merely 
subvert or critique the codes of the mainstream, as what is beneficial is 
the crafting of "useless" media that is more autonomous and less intent 
to crack the mirror that is the centre. 
A related problem of the age of digitalism is that contemporary media 
artists, unlike the fringe video and filmmakers of previous generations, 
have not only had to contend with a loss of indexicality (which is to say 
the difficulty or veritable impossibility for the filmlvideo image to connect 
with, point to, andtor represent a reality which exists in extraction and 
proximity) but, more pertinently, they are dealing with the fact that capi- 
talism has produced a world that is already saturated with "too many" 
images. There are numerous elements which are significant about this 
shift, though in experimenting with the conditions produced by these 
changes, the fringe artist develops affective paths to the "new." In this 
light, a world that is clogged with commodified media (both sound and 
image-based) can be seen, optimistically, as a database for artists. If it is 
true, as some assume, that all images have already been made then, as Lev 
Manovich would say,lO the task of the artist now is to create, not just 
react. One way of creating involves developing new affective "interfaces" 
to  the database of already-available commodity-images in order to 
develop meaningful "sorting mechanisms." 
Indeed, if after the death of God [Nietzsche], the End of grand Narratives 
of Enlightenment [Lyotard] and the arrival of the web [Tim Berners-Lee] 
the world appears to us as an endless and unstructured collection of 
images, texts, and other data records, it is only appropriate that we will be 
moved to model it as a database. But it is also appropriate that we would 
want to develop the poetics, aesthetics, and ethics of this database." 
Manovich's idea applies in particular to many recent fringe works. Ho 
Tam's video 99 Men (1998), for example, presents the viewer with a series 
of 99 portraits of Asian men organized so that each photograph appears 
slightly out of focus. The three-minute piece is sutured together with light 
string music that seems to have been hijacked from an Asian melodrama, 
giving a simultaneously whimsical and menacing tone to Tam's work, as 
the experiencer is gradually obliged to make meaning of this expressive 
interrelationship. As a result, 99 Men can be seen on one level as an inter- 
face that alludes to the politics of racial profiling, in that the artist is ask- 
ing the viewer to examine the cultural stereotype that all Asian men 
presumably look alike. The images of these men have indeed already been 
made (and likely reproduced countless times in yearbooks, magazines, or 
perhaps mug-shot albums), although Ho Tam's intent is neither to make 
new images, nor to identify an indexical relationship between the photos 
and a specific historical past. Rather, he uses the medium of video as a the- 
oretical "sorting mechanism," a homoerotic interface to a racist database 
that gives us meaningful insight into how all databases are organized and 
carry messages as to how they are to be used, by whom, and to what end. 
Perhaps the fringe needs to be reinvigorated as an explicitly anti-capi- 
talist space, insofar as capitalism instrumentalizes meaning and requires 
images to be ideologically "useful." Purportedly, one of the supposed 
"defining'' conditions of the video medium still being taught (definitely in 
academia's historicizing terms and when you look specifically to the 
"beginnings" of video and the aspirations of artists ranging from Nam 
June Paik to Vito Acconci to Joan Jonas) is that fringe works werelare not 
made for profit.12 Even more overtly anti-capitalist discursive strategies 
within fringe production communities do seem possible and might prove 
quite fruitful, especially in the way this practice could tie in with broader 
contemporary social movements such as that of labour, students, the 
working class, anti-poverty, and anti-globalization activists. However, 
anti-capitalist space is not the same thing as non-commercial space. Ulti- 
mately, capitalism is about encoding, framing meaning, and making 
meaning "useful"-often in terms of exchange-value, which is highly 
problematic. While non-profits often engage in this as well in their own 
small (different) ways, what the fringe does best is to uncode, to make 
useless work in the construction of a cinema of playful misunderstanding, 
of feeling, non-sensicality, and inconcise experience. 
The Cultural Value of (Canadian) Fringe Experientiality 
In her essay entitled "Melodrama Revisited,"l3 Linda Williams theorizes 
that the history of mainstream Hollywood cinema is founded on a melodra- 
matic narratology that effaces "real" tragedy so as to be accessible and dis- 
cernible to a mass audience. Williams is but one of many critics who argue 
that we need to determine what use audiences make of a cinematic work. 
Subsequently, she argues for the purposeful use of an embodied response: 
that the audience's investment is not one of rational interest in a story but 
an embodied response to affect which, in the context of the Hollywood cin- 
ema, has the use-value of binding viewers to the American ideology that the 
individual can triumph over social injustice. To re-work this argument for 
this discussion: what is the purposeful use of embodied responses to the 
fringe? What is its socio-cultural "use value," if you will, in terms of what 
those who experience it "get out of it"? Williams speaks about pathos as a 
reason for why the Hollywood audience goes to the multiplex to experience 
those kinds of films and what they get from their consumer spectatorship. 
While it is clear that the fringe does not have the same purposiveness, her 
essay causes me to wonder: why is the fringe audience there? 
I wish to assert that an affective response to experimental media need 
not be instrumental, as it is in Williams' description of melodrama, but 
can exist for its own sake, in the form of unbounded emotion and embod- 
ied feeling, or energy. Earlier I described how the particularities of a 
fringe work's form and content (the thingness of the light and image on 
screen in tandem with the sound bouncing about the undoubtedly poorly 
renovated auditorium) inform the particularities of what the viewer expe- 
riences in the body phenomenologically. My answer, then, is that the 
fringe audience is there to translate, to make "sense" of experimental 
works in order to elicit questioning or wonderment. These are phenom- 
ena which are only traceable or readable through bodily experience, thus 
the affective analysis of fringe works offers up a way to get beyond ideol- 
ogy critique, which, as I have argued, mainstream media now incorpo- 
rates because there is no "outside" to capitalism any more (if there ever 
was). Bodies are particular (subjectively constructed, located, and lived) 
and can respond in particular ways. Again, it seems the particularity of 
sensory experience while "taking in" fringe works is what must be 
stressed, as it allows one to look for what Deleuze calls the sensible, the 
resolutely particular. In doing so one must look to and produce fringe 
works that signal a shift towards a distinctive cinematic experientiality. 
There must be a balance between the need for malleable utility and practi- 
cality-of having an other-than-capitalist cinematic space that engenders 
thought, emotion, action-with the awareness that to make fringe works 
too useful is beside the point. 
Nevertheless, the "mainstream" (which is not as homogenous as one 
might think) is clearly purposive-it is for something, whether to sell 
things, to manipulate, to impart ideology, or to "move us" (as in 
Williams' understanding). So again, what is the fringe forlshould it be 
for? My response is that the cultural value of fringe work is that it should 
never be finitely pinned down in terms of the particularities of what it is 
about or wants to be about for the spectator who perceives it. I align 
myself with cognitivist media criticism to the extent that I believe fringe 
works are constructed so as to be made sense of. Although, more signifi- 
cantly, I wish to emphasize that the experience itself in its "uselessness" is 
more important than generating useful knowledge(s) in the brain sutured 
to ideology, which is the goal of most cognitive approaches. For example, 
in this context, an affective analysis of Susan C. Rynard's 1999 video The 
Day Jesus Melted emphasizes how it is fun, playful, sinful, serious; it is all 
of these things and none-it is many things. The video, in Deleuzean 
terms, makes a sensible rather than an abstract connection. The work 
must be felt in its particularity. Rather than making sense of a work in 
terms of "decoding" it, fringe audiences make it sensible in their bodies. 
Even still, the mainstream has changed! Formally and aesthetically it 
has long since incorporated the codes and conventions of the historical 
avant-garde, though of course it remains ideologically inflected. Arguably, 
the stark social and political consequences of linking capitalism to systems 
of communication, expressivity, and visuality are more pronounced now 
than ever before. The same digital cable revolution that appears to offer 
choice offers very little but the truth that choice is not (currently) ours to 
have-it is concentrated and elsewhere. In the context of the histories that 
Kibbins' talk described, which encompass anarchism and the Situationists' 
idea of art-making as a defiant "non-labour," one might assume that the 
fringe and its artists should/could be leading a resistant, productive 
response to the phenomena of transnational global capitalism. Videos such 
as 99 Men, Afternoon, Packin', Thorne's The Up and the Down (2001), 
or Aleessa Cohene's Absolutely (2001) do demonstrate that the fringe is 
currently continuing to respond, minus the end goal of utopianism that 
dogged earlier generations, but can experimentalists be doing more? 
The question about generational differences I was provided with as a 
means to focus my discussion for the Tulips conference panel caused me 
to wonder if "younger artists should (in fact) learn their history." In terms 
of the fringe, the history that is being taught has (to this point) lacked a 
sufficiently affective methodology to help make sense of experimental 
works as vibrant expressions of (cultural) theory. This absence of a dou- 
bly-articulated model for experiencing fringe media has produced a criti- 
cal viewership whereby the avant-garde can only be historicized on a scale 
that slides between the "success and failure" of previous productions and 
movements. Success in the sense that-"once upon a time not your own" 
-artists used to think that making film in a certain manner would change 
the way people thought about and behaved in the world; and failure in 
the sense that, once those films were made and received, the art-for- 
social-change experiment was revealed to have been a failed one, and the 
world stayed the same regardless. However, there are critics and theorists 
(such as William C. Wees, for example14) who, in a different way, have 
proposed alternative or shifting views of a history of the fringe. Similarly, 
I would argue that we need to further an understanding of ways of 
experiencing how the fringe's supposed "failure" (in terms of being co- 
opted into mainstream aesthetic hegemony), can be seen, in the "now," as 
a worthwhile "success," due to the notion that there can now be a clean 
slate for artists to make work in the present. 
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